

SOCIALISTS AND THE COMMONWEALTH

# Venture

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## WHITE HIGHLANDS POLICY

IT is not surprising that the announcement by the Kenya Government on land holdings in the European Highlands should arouse from a section of the white settlers bitter hostility or that Africans have refused their enthusiastic support for the measures proposed. The proposals are not put forward, however, to ameliorate the African hunger for land or as a scheme of African resettlement whatever the need may be for land acquisition and resettlement with government credit, training and support. The proposals must be regarded as only another stage in the break-up of the policy of the exclusive European Highlands, though the effectiveness of the measures proposed has yet to be proved. Members of the Fabian Bureau have laboured for years, before the war and since, against this unjust discrimination in the White Highlands policy, and the names of Norman Leys, MacGregor Ross and Charles Roden Buxton are honoured for the opposition they conducted during their lives. The policy now modified poisoned the relations between white and black, and though, from a short view, it gave a certain economic advantage to Kenya, it was but part of the struggle of the Europeans for race exclusiveness and supremacy.

The Labour Government tried to nibble away the policy without much success, for the political conditions in Kenya were not ripe for destroying it. The Royal Commission later presented an unanswerable case for opening up the White Highlands, but the Kenya Government argued it must wait for a change of public opinion, public opinion being to them synonymous with European feeling. Events have brought a growth of liberal opinion among some of the European leaders, and the continuance of the discrimination against competent African farmers has become more intolerable than ever. No small part among the causes of the Mau Mau outrages can be attributed to the hatred stimulated by the exclusion of

Africans from land holding in the European part of the Highlands. The injustices done by the imposition of the policy, the confiscation of African land which outraged the deepest sentiment in African life, the European failure to use the land in their unit to the full while the African reserves were crowded, all made propaganda among Africans for a better use of their own land singularly difficult.

### First Stage

Bureau members have continued their agitation for a change of policy—by debate, pamphlets and representation to Governor and the Colonial Secretary of State. We welcome therefore the new Government paper as a last fling by the Governor and the Colonial Secretary as they leave office. It is a worthy act though only the first stage in an important change in policy. Mr. Mboya is reported as saying that the Government have failed to meet the African demands, that the Highlands should be opened and a comprehensive settlement programme applied for Africans. The Government should acquire, he says, established farms for Africans and offer credit facilities and training to enable them to develop the farms. Mr. Moi thinks that the proposals are calamitous and will exclude Africans perpetually from the Highlands. Policy should aim at the acquisition of land for resettlement of the thousands of African landless and satisfy African land hunger. These opinions may be fair comment and as a policy are worthy of consideration, but they miss the essential point of the Government announcement. It was inevitable in all the circumstances surrounding the problem that the new step be taken and at first be controlled. The measures do not go far enough and are not necessarily the best, since they are something of a compromise, but at least, discrimination by race is denounced, the Euro-



pean-dominated Highlands Board will be dissolved and applicants for leases tested in terms of good husbandry, sound agricultural development and competence and not race.

The proposals suggest that at district level applicants must be approved by a board dominated by European farmers who will test them as to the quality of the farm they wish to work, their resources to develop it and their ability to farm. If the applicant is rejected he can appeal to a Regional Board and finally to a Central Land Board with equal numbers of African, Asian and European members. African applicants may of course feel that they are trying to get through the eye of a needle, but with a little time we do not doubt the measure will be broadened and Africans obtain a greater footing. Captain Briggs protests that the policy breaks every pledge ever made by the British Government to European settlers and will force the integration of the races and discourage further European settlement and investment. He knows, however, that the old policy was wrong from the beginning, was short-sighted and that European agriculture is not prejudiced where competent African farmers are settled alongside European farms—there is ample evidence of this in Africa. We hope the Europeans will co-operate in admitting Africans to buy or lease uncultivated land and play their fair part in the progressive disappearance of racial land barriers.

We must emphasise that the new policy is an important pronouncement in Kenya land policy. In recent years substantial changes have been taking place in land tenure and consolidation in African land holdings. We hope that by these new proposals the Kenya authorities will not press at this stage, so comprehensive a policy which exposes land in the African reserves to a free for all market and weaken the control of African interests by the transfer to non-Africans of African land. They explain that these intentions embrace both the reserves and the Highlands, but this is a time when African land hunger increases through the new land policies and growth in population. African criticism is therefore justified that if the new announcement leads to some Africans tenantry or owning land in the European Highlands the fundamental problem of land for African cultivation is hardly touched, and so far as the Highlands are concerned where no difficulties occur with the European-dominated divisional boards considerable capital and credit are required for buying and developing the farmland Africans may be permitted to occupy. They ask that big blocks of European-owned land should be transferred. It must also be added that the proposals are unfortunately confined to *individual*

tenure with little thought of forming by co-operative groups of African small holdings, a method which has been so successful in Africa already. But even if European farmers are prepared to lease their farms or sell in whole or in part, the procedure for Africans will probably be expensive and exhausting, and because they have proved their good husbandry and conduct in the reserves their transfer will be disadvantageous to the standards in the reserves and may possibly produce a special class of cultivators among Africans. It is a pity that the Government, yielding often to European pressure, can after long delays in doing the right thing, proceed with land policy only in bits and pieces.

The barriers against Indians are also lowered. Outside the native land units leaseholders may convert their holdings to freehold title, and in urban areas restrictions will not be allowed on non-agricultural land against ownership or occupation on ground of race. Steps will be taken to prevent the imposition of racially restrictive covenants by individuals.

There will be some months of delay before the policy is implemented. The public in Kenya have their opportunity to discuss the proposals and became accustomed to them. We hope the Government will remain firm in their purpose of removing the race barrier to the European Highlands and bring in the appropriate measures. We have ourselves, like the Africans, made our contribution to the change of mental climate regarding the wrong now being remedied. We welcome the destruction in principle of a policy which has caused so much illiberality and bitterness. It must never be resorted to again.

A. CREECH JONES

## **Comment**

### **ELECTION DEFEAT**

IT has quickly become clear that the electoral defeat of the British Labour Party has saddened Africans and been welcomed by most European settlers. This is natural because the Labour Party now stands for ultimate undiluted democracy in Africa, whilst the Conservative Party supports the maintenance of white supremacy in one guise or another. The stark fact remains that Africa faces another five years—and a vitally important five years—of Tory rule.

Yet it should not be thought that nothing has been gained. During the British election colonial issues played a more direct role in 1959 than in any previous election. Hola, Nyasaland and Cyprus took their place in almost every Labour candidate's speech, were brought on to the television screen, and played a major part in Mr.



Gaitskell's appeal to the nation. The Labour Party has moved another big step towards recognising the vital significance of colonial issues in the determination of British international influence.

There is every reason to suppose that the Tories have now realised that they have lost important sympathy and support by their disastrous policies in Central Africa and at Hola. All the serious newspapers and periodicals singled out the colonial issue as the main reason for changing the Government. By the appointment of Mr. Macleod as Colonial Secretary the Prime Minister has shown his own recognition of this danger to his party. It seems likely that Mr. Macleod is to be given responsibility for checking the dangerous revulsion against British government which has resulted from Mr. Lennox-Boyd's policies in multi-racial Africa.

In opposition again the Labour Party can be relied on to act as a still more vigilant watchdog for democratic interests in the African continent. The Party is now firmly based on principle in its colonial outlook. It speaks with greater confidence and conviction as a result. Its ties with African leaders have never been so close, and it will give them sound, principled advice, criticising them as friends when it believes that they are taking the wrong path, but always respecting their right to take their own decisions. Morality in the colonies and strengthened ties with the Commonwealth can play an important part in revitalising the Labour Movement. The strength and wisdom of that movement can still be of inestimable value to the colonial political struggles.

## THE WEST INDIES

**S**HORTLY after the agreement to establish a West Indian Federation Mr. Norman Manley, Chief Minister of Jamaica, spoke optimistically of the economic benefits that might follow. 'I think it is true to say,' he declared, 'that the most important of the "new powers" given to the Federal Government are these: (1) trade, industry and commerce; (2) the migration and travels of peoples in the area. Alongside of that, there will be power to raise money by loans, power to lend money to the various island governments, power to control banking and currency, and to create a customs union in an area of free trade. And also a combined policy in foreign trade, with similar taxation on imports.' He went on, 'We got the British Government to agree to explore immediately and sincerely the possibility of establishing a Regional Economic Development plan aided by other Commonwealth countries, and by such countries as the U.S.A.—something broadly talked of in these days as a plan like the Colombo Plan, under which the British Commonwealth and

the U.S.A. contributed considerable sums to the development of far eastern areas'.

The recent break-up of the Conference of territorial governments shows that the West Indies is still very far from reaching these objectives. Jamaica is going rapidly ahead with a remarkably successfully economic development. But Manley in May of this year issued a Minister's Paper which proposed *inter alia* that the 'concurrent list' of powers in the Federal Constitution 'should be revised so as to exclude from the possibility of Federal control and leave in the control of each unit (a) development of industry, (b) power to levy income tax, and (c) power to levy excise duties and consumption taxes'.

At first sight this looks very much as if Jamaica were adopting the 'I'm all right, Jack' policy on which the Tories in Britain have won the election. But observers who have recently visited the West Indies believe that the failure of the Federal Government to develop an economic plan and a planning mechanism (including a central bank) results largely from the preparatory work by people who did not believe in planning, stemming from the process which began with the Fiscal Commissioner's report and has been continued by the Customs Commission and the need to get the consent of all the units to planning for the Federation. These may be the main causes of Jamaican impatience, and Mr. Manley's apparent determination to go it alone. If there is a lack of drive and capacity to plan in the Federal Government, or if there is a certain selfishness bred of success in Jamaica—or if there is a bit of both—indeed, if there is some other explanation for the present impasse of which we have not heard, may we, as good comrades who greatly admire the contribution which the West Indies are making to non-racial democracy, express the hope that these differences can be ironed out *within* the Federal Labour Party in a spirit of comradeship? The breakdown of Federation would be a severe blow to all hopes of raising the living standards of the peoples of the smaller islands and a bitter disappointment to socialists.

## SOMALIA

**S**OMALIA, administered by the Italians for the last ten years, will become independent by December, 1960, the first target date to be imposed on a trusteeship power. 1,250,000 people, 70 per cent. of them nomadic pastoralists, living on low semi-desert land, have in the past been disunited by endemic intergroup conflict.

The largest party is the Somali Youth League, created under British military administration in 1943 as the nationalist party, and led by the young and progressive elements in the towns. The League won 83 of the 90 seats at the March



elections. The other main parties are the H.D.M.S. (Somali Independent Party) and the G.S.L. (Greater Somalia League). Despite tribal differences, all parties are Islamic and nationalist.

Democracy will take time to work. There is vital need for internal security and the formula is going to be first, stability, and then democracy. The S.Y.L. regard other parties as instruments of Egyptian influence or subsidised by the Ethiopian government. The Italian administration has done a good job in providing education and promoting Somalis in the civil service, unlike the British at Hargeisa. Of the 4,750 officials in central and local administration, 170 hold key responsible positions, and after independence only 33 important posts will be staffed by non-Somalis. In December, 1958, the police force was transferred to the new Somali commandant.

Visiting missions have issued recommendations on the country's unstable economy. Somalia has had an annual subsidy of over 10m. dollars for the last nine years, and outside aid is needed for years to come, particularly for irrigation and agricultural development. Bananas account for 60 per cent. of exports, but Somali bananas are unusually perishable and the industry is not competitive, so sugar cane, cotton and cereals must be developed. Long-term success depends basically

on the livestock industry, for there are no manufactures. Ever since 1905 the territory has been plagued by chronic budgetary deficits, and there is little direct taxation. The deficit is about 7m. dollars. European Common Market funds will supply 5m. dollars, the Italian, British and American governments will give assistance, and also Egypt, but for psychological and political reasons Somalia would prefer more United Nations Aid.

The union of British and Italian Somalia will be discussed after the February elections of 1960, when a Somali minister in Hargeisa will be deputed to go to Mogadishu. A blue-print may be available by the time Somali achieves independence.

In the past the Somalis have despised the Bantu but since the independence of Ghana they have identified themselves with African oppressed peoples. There remains the border dispute with Ethiopia. There is now less suspicion and some hope of a settlement. It is unwise to stress the antagonism between the Ethiopians and the Somalis. Much of this was created by the West in the past to cover up the European position following the scramble for Africa.

A solution is not impossible—the Somalis want to build a house—not a skyscraper.

## Nigeria's Election

By CATHERINE HOSKYNs

THE Nigerian federal election campaign began in September; polling day has been fixed for December 12th. The issue is who will control the federal assembly when Nigeria becomes independent in October, 1960, and, in the absence of any national party, the result is in considerable doubt.

The three main parties contesting the election are those which already control the three regional assemblies: in the Northern region, the Northern People's Congress, predominantly Hausa/Fulani and led by the Sardauna of Sokoto; in the West, the Action Group, predominantly Yoruba and led by Chief Awolowo; in the East, the National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons, predominantly Ibo and led by Dr. Azikiwe. In the past Nigerian politics have been regional politics; power has lain with the regional assemblies, glamour with the regional premiers. The coalition government at the centre under the prime minister, Alhaji Tafawa Balewa (the deputy president of the N.P.C.) has worked solidly, but the key politicians have remained in the regions. With independence final power devolves from Britain to the federal assembly. Who will take it up?

The redrawing of the constituencies has increased the number of federal M.P.s from 190 to 312 (the eight seats in the Cameroons will not now be con-

tested). Of these 312, 174 are in the Northern region, 73 in the Eastern region, 62 in the Western region and three in the federal territory of Lagos. The Action Group and the NCNC can control the federal assembly only if they win a substantial number of seats in the North or enter into alliance with the Northern leaders. The campaign has so far consisted of attempts by the Southern parties to gain a foothold in the North and efforts by the NPC to consolidate its position. The results in the East and West can be fairly confidently predicted; the overall result will be decided by the peasants of the Northern region voting for the first time on full adult male suffrage.

For electioneering purposes the Northern region can be divided into two East/West strips. The most northerly, the 'Far North', consists of the Hausa-dominated, Muslim provinces of Sokoto, Kano, Katsina, the northern parts of Zaria and Bauchi and the Kanuri province of Bornu. These cover 111 constituencies and with the exception of Bornu are strongly NPC. The only serious opposition in this area comes from the Northern Elements Progressive Union. NEPU has four seats in the regional assembly and supports the rights of the 'talakawa' (commoners) against the autocratic rule of the traditional leaders and the NPC. Its chief support is in the urban areas, but adult suffrage should con-



siderably increase its vote. In Bornu where the Kanuri tribe predominates the Bornu Youth Movement is traditionally opposed to the NPC.

The Southern strip, known as the 'Middle Belt,' consists of a great range of non-Muslim tribes, some owing allegiance to the NP.C., others agitating for a separate state, free from Hausa/Muslim domination. The people of this area feel that unless their interests are carefully tended they will be discriminated against. Here the United Middle Belt Congress holds 11 seats in the Northern house and nine in the federal assembly. Between the loyalties and fears of the Middle Belt tribes there is ample opportunity for canvassing and 63 seats are at stake.

The leaders of the NPC reject any suggestion that the Northern boundaries should be altered, and their slogan remains 'one North, one people, irrespective of religion, rank or tribe'. They have, however, in the last few years gone out of their way to assuage and divert the fears of the Middle Belt. The powers of the provincial authorities have been increased; development funds may now be used in any province irrespective of the amount of revenue that province contributes—a ruling which has much benefited the Middle Belt. More significant, they have set about winning the allegiance of the Middle Belt leaders by offering them high positions within the NPC. Six ministers in the Northern government come from the Middle Belt; the new Northern Commissioner in London is a man from Bornu; the Tor Tiv, traditional head of one of the largest Middle Belt tribes, has been made a first-class chief. A bitter Middle Belt crack is that their M.Ps. leave for Kaduna, UMBC, and return NPC. In the 1956 regional elections the NPC won 28 of the 43 Middle Belt seats.

### **NPC Policy**

Within the NPC there seems at the moment to be little chance of change. Relations between the Sardauna and the prime minister are said to be strained, but the latter has made no attempt to form a rival organisation either inside or outside the NPC. The NPC policy statement includes the principle that traditional institutions must be respected and maintained, lays its chief emphasis on education and recommends that Nigeria should remain within the Commonwealth and build up closer ties with Britain and the United States. A strategic committee has been set up to direct the election campaign and eight teams are touring the country.

The Action Group is the only party putting up candidates in all three regions and hopes to win an overall majority. In the Middle Belt and in the Calabar province of the Eastern region, it has, in the past, won considerable support by taking up the demands of these minorities for separate states. Its policy is to enter into alliance with local parties (such as UMBC) and pour money, personnel and administrative experience into the organisations so formed. In the North it rivals NEPU in championing the rights of the 'talakawa' and is allied with the Bornu Youth Movement. Action Group newspapers have been started in Jos and Kano; 20

jeeps and 1,000 bicycles have been sent to Sokoto province alone. Chief Awolowo himself scatters leaflets from a helicopter painted in the Action Group colours.

The declared policy aim of the Action Group is to bring to the whole of Nigeria the benefits of a welfare state, many of which they claim are already enjoyed by Westerners. In a series of half-page advertisements in the *Daily Times* they point out in simple terms the advantages of old age pensions, minimum wages, special treatment for the blind, and so on. Each advertisement ends with an injunction 'to vote AG'. No attempt is made to explain how these benefits would be financed. The Action Group foreign policy is to abandon the attitude of neutrality adopted by most Afro-Asian countries and to align Nigeria firmly with the West. The Action Group should win 50 seats in the West and up to 25 in the East. The imponderable is how far the people of the other regions will be alienated by the Yoruba assumption of superiority; how far they will be won over by superior organisation and attractive promises.

The NCNC is without funds and without efficient organisation. Its chief asset in the election is the prestige and shrewdness of its leader, Dr. Azikiwe, and the bargaining power of the 50 or so safe seats it holds in the East and West. From the start Dr. Azikiwe has poured scorn on the militant activities of the Action Group and, in a gamble to win the sympathy of the Northern leaders, has emphasised the importance of toleration, co-operation and respect for other people's traditions. The NCNC is traditionally allied with NEPU, but Dr. Azikiwe has also succeeded in coming to what is usually referred to as 'an accord' with the Sardauna and the NPC. The effects of this accord were first seen at the London Conferences last year when the NCNC and NPC leaders working together defeated the Action Group plans for creating new states before independence. Dr. Azikiwe's chief hope must be that the Action Group will win sufficient seats in the North for the NPC to have only a simple majority. He would then be in a good position to bargain the support of the NCNC for the post of prime minister for himself.

There are therefore these possibilities: that the NPC will retain its position in the North and win an overall majority, that the Action Group will win sufficient seats in the North and East to control the federal assembly, that in the event of no party winning an outright majority, a coalition is formed, probably between the NPC and the NCNC.

Will the peasants in the North listen to NEPU and the Action Group and take the opportunity of limiting the power of their traditional rulers, or will habit and control give the Sardauna the complete mandate for which he is asking? The answer is of crucial importance, for the exact proportion and location of seats won will considerably influence the policy of the winning party in the first few years of independence. Nigeria's future depends on her ability to develop a national government. Regional rivalries, as in the West Indies, could break the Federation.



# THE POLITICAL ECONOMY

THE problem of the status and ownership of land has always been the major dynamic in Kenya politics. After World War I Africans bitterly opposed the alienation of well over 10m. acres of their lands and the subsequent grant or lease of those lands to foreigners. The opposition precipitated in 1921 the famous ruling by Mr. Justice Barth,<sup>2</sup> that all lands occupied by African tribes were Crown lands of which the natives were tenants at will of the Crown. African reaction was sharp and categorical and has remained substantially the same to this day: in African eyes the land is owned by the tribe, or by a clan within the tribe and hence both the concept of Crown ownership and the vesting of African lands in the Native Lands Trust Board are no more than a legal artifice.

## Ownership Rights

Thus, although in 1938-39 the government passed the Kenya (Native Areas) Order in Council, and the Native Lands Trust Ordinance which (until the current changes) have governed the native lands, in practice land use and control continued under native law and custom. So when the government decided to embark upon land consolidation, it was faced with a tricky problem for, in general, tribal law and custom did not recognise full individual ownership of land. How then were the rights of each landholder to be ascertained? What sort of title would the individual holder be given thereafter? And who, under the existing law, would grant the title.

In March, 1957, the government appointed a working party on African land tenure—with no African representation—charged . . . 'to examine and make recommendations as to the measures necessary to introduce a system of land tenure capable of application to all areas of the native lands, with particular reference to (a) the status of land in respect of which title is issued, (b) the nature and form of title to be granted, the incidence of tenure and any restrictions on land transaction. . . ' The working party were to be guided by the government policy statement of June, 1956, which said . . . 'It is the policy of the government to encourage the emergence of individual land tenure amongst Africans where conditions are ripe for it, and, in due course, to institute a system of registration of negotiable title. . . ' How was this to be achieved? The working party reported in July, 1958. Their recommendations were accepted and embodied in the Native Land Registration Bill and the Native Land Control Bill, 1959. The two central ideas being: (a) that Land Consolidation Committees should list those persons whose rights they consider should be recognised in full ownership, and that subsequent registra-

tion should convert that recognition into a freehold title, and (b) that the control of transactions in land should be through a new hierarchy of land control boards with the primary object of preventing the fragmentation of land into sub-economic units.

Land consolidation has been going on for nearly three years and is almost completed in the Kikuyu districts. The procedure in the determination of existing rights was laid down in the Native Land Tenure Rules, 1956. These rules are now incorporated into the new Land Registration Bill.

Very briefly, the procedure is this. The Minister for African Affairs decides when to apply the law to an area in the native lands. Great publicity is then given through *barazas*, the press and radio of the intention to consolidate. If the idea gains general public support the administrative machinery is set in motion. This consists at the lowest level of a land consolidation committee of not less than 25. It is appointed by the district commissioner from among persons resident in the location. At the district level there is an arbitration board of not less than five persons selected by the district commissioner from a panel appointed by the provincial commissioner.

The functions of the committee are defined in the Registration Bill as to 'adjudicate upon and determine in accordance with native law and custom, the claim of any individual person to any right or interest in any land within the adjudication section. When all such claims have been determined it is open to the people to raise any objections within 30 days. Then replanning or consolidation begins. The committee first sets aside such lands as are required for schools, hospitals, churches, and so on. Each landowner contributes an equal percentage of his land for this purpose. The committee then allocates to each landowner an area equal in acreage to his former holding or sum of holdings, having regard so far as is possible to the site, quality, nature and extent of the land to which each landowner was entitled. People such as the 'ahoi'<sup>3</sup> whose interests, in the committee's opinion, do not, in native law and custom, amount to ownership get from the landowner similar interests in his new land holding or alternatively are paid compensation.

The control of future dealings in such lands is provided by the Land Control (Native Lands) Bill, 1959, which establishes at the lowest level a Divisional native land control board, the approval of which must normally be obtained for any transaction affecting land in the division.

Then there are the provincial boards which may forbid a divisional board from giving consent to any transaction and certain transactions (e.g. those involving members of different races) may require its

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Kibaki has recently returned to Kenya after studying at the London School of Economics.

<sup>2</sup> Isaka Wainaina and another v. Muritowa Indangara and others, 1921. *East Africa Law Reports*, Vol. IX, p. 102.

<sup>3</sup> A 'muhoi' (pl. 'ahoi') is a man who is given by a landowner cultivation rights on a piece of land free and for nothing.



# AND IN KENYA by MWAI KIBAKI<sup>1</sup>

consent. The decisions are final, subject only to directions from the Governor.

Let us now turn to the debate amongst Kenyans over this agrarian revolution. The benefits to be derived from land consolidation and individual ownership appear obvious, in the context of a capitalist economy. Farm planning and layout are facilitated, and this should make for greater productivity per acre and per farmer. Secondly, the granting of freehold will create for Africans negotiable capital assets on the strength of which they can raise loans for development.

Again, the land enclosure movement which started in Nyeri District about 1948 is spreading apace to Kisii, Kericho, Nyanza, West Suk, Machakos, etc., and the government cannot long delay action to rationalise and guide this movement. Socially it is claimed that individual land ownership will create a new 'landed class' which, secure in its title and with a permanent stake in the country, will be a force for political stability. Equally a free market in land may make it easier for people of any tribe to settle anywhere in Kenya and this will encourage social and cultural integration. Finally the government seems to consider the timing and speed of the change satisfactory—indeed fortunate. The Kikuyu had, as an operational measure in the fight against Mau Mau, to be herded into villages. The actual administration was therefore easier, and if consolidation quickly proves a success, it will gain general acceptance.

## African Criticisms

All this seems easy to appreciate, and in fact the African elected members support land consolidation in principle. Their criticisms of government policy centre around four main points:—

First, that the government has undertaken a major agrarian revolution without the necessary overall economic planning to meet the resultant social and economic problems. Many families will become landless; unemployment is already very high in Kikuyu districts. After consolidation in the Kiambu district 4,300 of the registered holdings are less than one acre, and the families on these holdings who would have supplemented their incomes from short-term cultivation rights granted by friendly landowners and grazing their goats and collecting firewood from 'the common', find their standards of living abruptly lowered.

These effects, the African members claim, can only be obviated if the scheme whereby the Agricultural Settlement Board buys over-large farms in the European highlands, subdivides them and leases them to aided tenants (at present to Europeans only) is expanded into a major resettlement scheme. It is for this reason that they are critical of the new proposals which open the highlands only to those who can afford to buy on the open market—for hardly any of the displaced Africans can.

Furthermore, the agrarian revolution changes not merely economic or productive relations, but also

the closely-knit African system of social responsibility and social security. Common rights are restricted; communal responsibilities disappear. The government has not yet shown how it intends to provide alternative forms of social security, particularly for old people.

Secondly, although the government claims that it is doing 'nothing that is not consistent with tribal law and custom', there have been frequent complaints of corruption and of incomplete investigation of claims—all of which is hardly surprising in view of the speed of the operation and the unsettled condition of the reserves where large numbers of people are absent in detention camps.

Thirdly, the new land control machinery gives too much new power to the already over-mighty district commissioners and district officers.

Fourthly, and most significant, the granting of freehold in African land units is seen as a prelude to the grant of similar tenure in the European highlands. This fear has in fact been amply confirmed by the White Paper published last month which allows Europeans in the White Highlands to turn their leaseholds into freeholds regardless of race and tribe, as far as local and ecological factors will permit.<sup>4</sup>

Now, in the native areas, as the working party emphasised, the process of land consolidation and registration does *not* purpose to give the individual any rights which he did not already have under native law and custom: 'A person whom the committees (i.e. the Africans themselves) consider to be the owner will be *confirmed* by the new laws in the highest form of tenure known to the law of Kenya'. Africans may be persuaded to accept this view. But they consider the case of the European lands as entirely different. 'Africans believe that those lands were in the first instance alienated from their native owners by an imperialist government which then went on to lease them to or reserve them for foreign settlers. The Africans refuse to accept that that same government has any right to grant individual freehold tenure in those lands.'

Thus the debate goes on. The government is set on full-fledged capitalism. The Africans are critical of the consequences of this policy; but they have not yet thought out an alternative—largely because they have not yet resolved in their own minds certain basic questions. For instance, can communal tribal life survive in the face of growing industrialisation? If not, do we go straight for the capitalist productive and social relations or are there alternatives, e.g. co-operatives? And, in all this, how much weight do we give to social stability if and when it conflicts with our other goals, such as rapid economic and political development?

All these problems require much detailed thinking before any real solution can be found for Kenya's land problem.

<sup>4</sup> Mr. Coutts, Legco. 22nd April. 1959.



## Correspondence

To the Editor of VENTURE.

### SETBACK IN KENYA

Sir,—The above comment in your October issue over simplifies a confused situation and shows a regrettable tendency to make Mr. Mboya the 'villain of the piece' in the split of the African Elected Members. Further, it stresses only the danger that the K.I.M. will become increasingly extreme, without mentioning other and perhaps greater dangers on the other side.

Mr. Mboya has in the past made many concessions to maintain the unity of the African Elected Members. Feeling strongly about the need for a united stand at the coming constitutional conference, is it likely that he would willingly have 'forced this split' now that the unity has begun to have results? The fact that all the leading African nationalists—except for Mr. Ngala—have been with Mr. Mboya in refusing to join the National Party may indicate a realisation of the political realities of Kenya rather than any outburst of African racialism. There seems to be no particular reason why co-operation between the different racial representatives through the Constituency Elected Members Organisation, which had achieved its first victory in getting the Conference accepted, could not have continued and the formation of political parties been postponed until the constitutional amendments had been achieved. There seem to be no big differences between the African Members about what they want from this Conference; the first policy statements of the Kenya National Party and the Kenya Independence Movement showed no fundamental differences.

Mr. Mboya, Mr. Odinga, and Dr. Kiano—who must at present be considered as a group—are sufficiently astute to realise the ground which has been lost by the split. In this respect it is interesting to remember that after the PAFMECA conference recently, Mr. Mboya expressed his own support for the dissolution of K.I.M. if the K.N.P. were also dissolved and the old organisation resuscitated.

The existence of two groups whose declared policies show little difference is certainly likely to lead to bitterness between them so that they become further and further apart. But just as K.I.M.—registered or not—may stress the difference by becoming more uncompromising in its attitudes, so K.N.P. may well develop along even more unhealthy lines. Already some of its leaders seem to be showing tribalist inclinations, and this is in the long run more dangerous to Kenya's future—and to that of the members of minority communities. A strong nationalist movement, organising freely, could be a progressive body; a Party claiming to be non-racial, branches of which exclude all members of a particular tribe, cannot possibly contribute to the development of a democracy in Kenya however moderate it claims to be.

We in Britain can do nothing in the question of this division between the African elected members. It is, however, important that when the constitutional changes are being considered we should avoid

being taken in by the forms of any political party, and should concentrate on eliminating from the Kenyan scene the remaining discriminations against the African population—politically and otherwise. Our first aim should be to strengthen organisations which could be powerful progressive forces and which could stress the unity of the people of Kenya in the face of the tremendous economic and social problems which face the country. We must also abandon once and for all our attempts to protect minority groups as such, and endeavour instead to support institutions and attitudes which will protect the rights of individuals in the state.

We shall not be able to do these things if we waste our efforts on blaming an individual for a split which has occurred, particularly when this is against such evidence as we possess. Nor shall we help by lecturing the individual about how much better a position would be in if he were to lead a Party which it is unlikely he ever was, or would have been, asked to lead.

### A CORRESPONDENT

To the Editor of VENTURE.

#### PAFMECA

Sir,—I would like to say briefly why the Kenya National Party was refused admission to membership of the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa.

At the Zanzibar conference it was agreed as a matter of policy that all PAFMECA countries should achieve responsible government before the end of the year 1960. The K.N.P. policy statement disagrees with PAFMECA. K.N.P. states that the period when responsible government could be considered is between 1964 and 1968. This is why among other things the K.N.P. was refused membership.

It should be noted that the Afro-Shirazi Party is a multi-racial party; there are Africans, Arabs and Indians in it. So is the Zanzibar Nationalist Party. It could not be at all reasonable to refuse K.N.P. membership on the grounds that its membership was multi-racial.

R. KAMINYOGI MWANJISI,

*Tanganyika African National Union.*

Dar-es-Salaam.

To the Editor of VENTURE.

### SOUTHERN CAMEROONS

Sir,—In view of your comment on the Southern Cameroons in the October issue of VENTURE, it might interest you to know how Mr. Foncha and I reached agreement on the way in which the Southern Cameroons should determine its future. As you stated, Mr. Foncha and I went to the session of the United Nations with entirely different proposals. I wished in the plebiscite to give the people a choice between continuing as a separate region of an independent Nigeria and unifying with the French Cameroons. He wanted the choice to be between remaining with Nigeria and continuing as a Trustee-ship territory.



On the 24th September we made our statements to the Fourth Committee of the United Nations. The Committee did not want to impose a solution on the Southern Cameroons, and in particular did not feel able to go against the wishes of the Prime Minister of that territory. The independent African States, therefore, agreed to hold unofficial consultations with Mr. Foncha and myself and to try to reach some compromise.

After lengthy discussions Mr. Foncha and I agreed that the plebiscite should be postponed for two years and on 30th September we put this proposal before the Fourth Committee. The Committee, however, decided that they could not accept this proposal since the purpose of the Committee was to bring trusteeship to an end and not to continue it.

We again with drew and finally agreed that the plebiscite should be postponed until March, 1961, and that the questions should give a direct choice between remaining with Nigeria and unification with the French Cameroons. This proposal was accepted with two abstentions by the Fourth Committee on 10th October. This decision involves withdrawing from the Nigeria federation when she becomes independent in 1960, until the time of the plebiscite.

In spite of the fact that I hold very strongly to the views which I expressed at the first meeting with the Fourth Committee, it became necessary for me to seek some form of compromise with Mr. Foncha in order that we might make it possible for the Fourth Committee to reach a decision. Mr. Foncha would only agree to the choice of questions which I proposed on condition that the plebiscite should be withheld until he had time to watch developments in the French Cameroons.

E. M. L. ENDELEY

(Leader of the Opposition, S. Cameroons)

## Colonial Secretary

LENNOX BOYD met increasing difficulties in the last part of his administration at the Colonial Office. He worked hard, with fervour and enthusiasm, and was extraordinarily attached to his office. But he had too little human insight or understanding of the political aspirations of the people in the territories. With his resignation, eulogies have been paid him for his remarkable qualities, his patience in negotiation and his sympathetic awareness of the requirements of our modern age. His failures have been excused. If there were flashes of sympathy and understanding, he was also in the tradition of the imperialists. Although a Colonial Secretary should know the dependent territories, their leaders, people and problems, he was too hurried and insistent a traveller to penetrate deeply and study and appreciate the wide range of subjects which a Secretary of State should master. As he pursued his work he became more glib and tough.

He did best when he built on the work of his Labour predecessors: in the West Indies, Ghana, Malaya and Nigeria. His failures were grievous, and some of them brought grave discredit on British policy throughout the world and endangered Afro-

Asian relations with the West. It cannot be forgotten that he was an active party in the imposition of federation on Central Africa and the subsequent concessions to Sir Roy Welensky, that his handling of Cyprus was clumsy and tragic, that he accepted the repression of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, retreated from the Devlin Report and refused to hold an independent enquiry into the conditions of the detention prisons in Kenya.

There is much more evidence of his mistakes than we record, and we can only hope that his successor will bring a more liberal mind to his task and write a more enlightened chapter in colonial history. Certainly the Colonial Office is still one of the more important appointments in the Cabinet, and a great opportunity awaits Mr. Macleod. The independence of Nigeria moves to the last stage in its fulfilment; the Central African Conference in 1960 has to be shaped and Sir Roy Welensky's demands resisted; a new Kenya has to be instituted and the difficulties in Uganda resolved: the West Indies have to be helped to surmount the obstacles to federation; and the unhappy situation in Malta brought to an end. Aden, Somaliland, Fiji, Borneo also present difficulties in the years immediately ahead. And besides other political problems there is no less need for aiding the economic development and social and educational life of most of the overseas territories, and securing for them the technical and financial assistance they desperately want. A greater and more generous response must be given to the efforts of the United Nations. At the same time, the whole structure of British responsibility as exercised in Whitehall will have to be dealt with and plans laid, when Nigeria passes to the Commonwealth Relations Office, for a complete reorganisation of the Colonial Office and the related office.

A. CREECH JONES

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# Parliament and the Colonies

ON the debate on the Queen's Speech, the Opposition moved an amendment on Government policy in Central Africa. Mr. James Callaghan opened the debate.

The prime task of the new Colonial Secretary was, he said, to restore the confidence of Africans in Central Africa in the good intentions of the Conservative Government. He suggested four things that would indicate whether Mr. Macleod realised the urgency of this: the action taken to end the emergency in Nyasaland, the composition of the Monckton Commission, the constitutions in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia and the plans for the constitutional conference.

**Nyasaland:** Mr. Callaghan stated that Nyasaland had been a police state for eight months. The African press was censored, while the European press was left free to 'utter calumnies against African leaders, to distort their policies and ferment racial hatred'. In the Legislative Council, Mr. Chiume and Mr. Chipembere, both indirectly elected by Africans, had been replaced by four members nominated by the governor. £700,000 was to be spent in strengthening the police force in Nyasaland.

**The Monckton Commission:** Mr. Callaghan paid tribute to Lord Monckton, but went on, 'the Government and Lord Monckton must face the fact that if they are to restore African confidence, and if the Commission is to serve some useful purpose, then the African himself must have confidence in the instrument that the Government are setting up.

There are to be 26 members of the Commission. Of these 26 members only five are to be Africans, and they are not to be selected by the African people.

I do not believe that the Colonial Secretary can get the necessary goodwill of the Africans unless he is ready to face the fact that Dr. Banda and his leading associates in Nyasaland, and Mr. Nkumbula and Mr. Kaunda and their associates in Northern Rhodesia, should be in some way or other associated with the Commission. Either they should be members of it or should give their blessing to those who serve on it. If the Government were willing to do that, I believe that it would transform the attitude of the African people towards the Commission.

He asked the Colonial Secretary to state whether the Commission would be free to consider any scheme other than Federation for linking these territories.

**The Northern Territories:** On the questions of the constitutions for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland Mr. Callaghan said, 'We should say to the people of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia openly, frankly and generously that we shall introduce large-scale reforms and a wide extension of the franchise so that they can elect their own people to come to the London talks in 1960.'

**The Constitutional Conference:** Mr. Callaghan welcomed the assurance from Sir Roy Welensky that he would not press for dominion status in 1960 but warned that to transfer power to the territories in

advance of giving the Africans inside the territories the right to elect their own governments would be equally dangerous. He suggested that the conference should be postponed for two years.

The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Macleod replied.

**Nyasaland and the Emergency:** Mr. Macleod stated that he would be having consultations with the governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in the middle of November and that he hoped to find some way by which governors could deal with periods of unrest without having to relay 'on the sledge-hammer of the Emergency Powers Order in Council'.

He stated that since the declaration of the emergency in Nyasaland on March 3rd 1,328 Africans had been detained. Of these 830 had been released as a result of the process of review, and 459 remained in detention.

**The Monckton Commission:** Mr. Macleod gave the terms of reference of the Monckton Commission as: 'In the light of the information provided by the Committee of Officials and of any additional information the Commission may require, to advise the five Governors in preparation for the 1960 review, on the constitutional programme and framework best suited to the achievement of the objects contained in the Constitution of 1953 including the Preamble.

In answer to Mr. Callaghan's request that Dr. Banda and the major political parties in the Federation should be represented on the Commission, he stated: 'Apart from the suggested representation from the United Kingdom Parliament in view of our special responsibilities, we have deliberately excluded from membership representatives of parties or of members of legislative councils, and this is because the proper place for these people is in the witness box giving evidence to the Monckton Commission rather than being members themselves of that Commission. . . . In order to show that there is no intention at all of stifling the opinions of those who respond to the invitation of the Commission, we are prepared to publish in full the statements submitted to the Commission or the evidence given before it, subject only to the understanding that those witnesses, and those witnesses alone, who do not wish their evidence to be published may ask that it should not be made public.

He refused to make any answer at this point as to whether the Monckton Commission would be able to consider any alternative to Federation.

**The Constitutional Conference:** Mr. Macleod drew attention to article 99 of the Federal constitution which stated that the conference should 'consist of delegations from the Federation, from each of the three territories and from the United Kingdom Government, chosen by the respective governments for the purpose of reviewing the constitution.' Delegates were not therefore restricted to members of the Legislative assemblies of Central Africa.



# Guide to Books . . .

## Old Africa Rediscovered

By Basil Davidson (Gollancz. 25s.)

Newly established groups always deepen and glorify their history, in order to heighten their prestige and to strengthen their internal bonds. The Union of South Africa, for example, with its 300 years of history, celebrates publicly more historical events than Britain does; and therefore it is not surprising that the newly established, and to some extent artificial, independent African states should try to find a long history for themselves, going back into pre-colonial times. They will obviously exaggerate the greatness of anything they find in their past. On the other hand, many Whites in the states where they dominate over Africans have an interest in decrying the capacity for civilisation of these Africans and their ancestors. As far back as 1905 Randall-Maciver declared that the stone city Zimbabwe, in Southern Rhodesia, had been built by Bantu-type people, and not by Phrygians or other outsiders. This finding was confirmed by Caton-Thompson in 1929, and publicly declared by the Rev. Neville-Jones during the war in a pamphlet written for R.A.F. personnel training in Rhodesia: yet the fact that this is so, is still denied by many. Hence the scholarly task of establishing the history of the peoples, the cultures, and indeed the civilisations of Africa is threatened with wreck on two political rocks of exaggeration. Mr. Davidson has boldly, yet modestly, tried to set out for laymen the results of researches by archaeologists, historians, and anthropologists, in this field; and he gives their conclusion that the various Negro peoples had established fairly highly developed, iron-working, agricultural, and trading states over most of the Africa south of the Sahara in pre-colonial eras.

I came to the reading of the book in some spirit of partisanship, for both in South Africa and Rhodesia I have often had to argue the case that Bantu built Zimbabwe with my fellow-Whites. It is a fair measure of Davidson's achievement that I quickly lost the feeling that we were engaged in a study involving Whites and Blacks in present-day stormy Africa, and felt that I was learning the story of a great human achievement and a sad human tragedy. For he has succeeded in writing a book in which one ceases to think of the protagonists of the continental drama as Africans, Arabs, Indians, Chinese, Portuguese, and instead sees them as human-beings making hazardous trading voyages and traverses of the desert, spreading link on link of contact between one another, and building up cities and civilisations. We even see that those who thus created were moved by the same motives as those who came later and destroyed what had been built. This book thus encapsulates the whole tragedy of mankind.

Much of this story is already well known to specialists in the history of different regions, but they will be grateful to Davidson for putting their various

researches together so skilfully in one book; and indeed I would agree with Miss Jacquetta Hawkes that his suggestions for further research to fill in crucial gaps merit careful attention by the specialists. I can only judge the accuracy with which he reproduces and interprets the findings and facts for the region I have studied myself, South-Central Africa and its East Coast entrepôts to Asia. There are here points where I think he has made mistakes, but none of them is serious enough for me to say: if he makes these mistakes on regions I know, how can I trust him on the regions I don't know? Indeed, I would say the opposite: so much is correct, that I do trust him on those other regions. His interpretations of facts are most carefully set out, and he puts forward alternative interpretations with great care and fairness. Altogether he has written a remarkable book: as I have said, a bold book, for it takes courage for a layman to rush in where specialists have feared to tread; and withal a modest book, for he continually and gladly acknowledges the extent to which he had depended on those specialists. In final praise, let me say it remains an individual book, Mr. Davidson's own. In places, some readers, like myself, will feel that the story, which speaks adequately for itself, has been over written; but even where, for a moment, he compares Sudanic Meroe with Athens, the comparison is literary and proportionate to the situation. A major defect is that the maps are inadequate.

Max Gluckman

## Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs

By Nicholas Mansergh (O.U.P., under auspices of R.I.I.A. 63s.)

It is inevitable, I suppose, that a degree of complacency and respectability should creep into the work of the Royal Institute of International Affairs—an objectivity calculated to promote acquiescence in the Establishment, confirmation of the protocol and belief in British virtue and wisdom. Just from time to time a challenging lecture may be heard and a stimulating book published. It will be said that the Institute's main function is to record, to research, to send the right people to important conferences and to give us the facts about the complex and difficult world of to-day. This book is an excellent piece of work and one of those things which should encourage the hopes of Mr. Kenneth Younger the new Director of the Institute. It is a remarkably good survey by Professor Mansergh reviewing the problems of wartime co-operation in the Commonwealth and the changes from 1939-1952. I feel admiration for his industry, respect for his liberal interpretations and appreciation of his skill in bringing such a vast theme within the space of just over 400 pages of clear type. I have used the index freely and found the subjects I know a little about dealt with lucidly, informatively and adequately.

We are led through these war and post-war years watching new chapters in British policy being written



and a substantially changed Commonwealth emerging. As a result of the shattering effects of war and the release of new creative influences, colonialism becomes bankrupt and the old imperialism effete; India, Ceylon and other independent nations take their place on the world stage, a movement to liberation emerges in Ghana. South-East Asia, Nigeria and other dependencies and a new pattern of world influence and power takes shape. It is a tricky development from supremacy and domination—trickier than we sometimes picture: we have only to mention a few issues such as the neutrality of Ireland, the blinkered rigidity of South Africa, the secession of Burma, the division of India and the changing relations with America, or to indicate a few problems concerned with inter-Commonwealth institutions, defence, place of the Crown, sterling, economic relations, nationalism, nationality and citizenship, national unity in multi-racial territories, etc., to see how Commonwealth ingenuity was taxed. All these and numerous other problems about international and Commonwealth relations are vividly discussed in this most valuable mine of history, information and ideas.

I need scarcely add that it was of immense importance to the world that in the post-war period a Labour Government guided the relations of London with what was formerly the British Empire. A Tory government may to-day succeed in completing some of the work we started, but had the war brought in its train a reactionary administration in Britain (recall a few of the exclamations of Winston Churchill, their leader) there might well have been a period of disaster, even worse than the Tory frustration we have recently witnessed in Cyprus, Central Africa, Kenya and Malta.

A. Creech Jones

## Rhodesia and East Africa

Ed. F. S. Joelson (*East Africa and Rhodesia*, 25s.)

Never before has such a team of imperial top brass been brought together to survey this area, or probably any other part, of the Commonwealth. The list of contributors reads like the *Who's Who* of the white settler communities; Lord Cranworth, Lord Malvern, Lord Milverton, the Earl of Portsmouth, Sir Charles Ponsonby, Sir Roy Welensky, Sir Edward Twining, Sir Robert Armitage, Sir Evelyn Baring and many others trace the history of these territories and seek to point the way ahead.

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Two Africans, Mr. Jasper Savanhu, former general secretary of the S. Rhodesian African Congress, and journalist Mr. Lawrence Vambe, who is now assistant information officer at Rhodesia House, supply two of the 50 chapters.

It is, in fact, essentially an account of the white man's burden and achievements, and although no contributor goes so far as Mr. Joelson in scorning the claims of Africans for a fair share in the job of running their country, it is the tacit assumption of many contributors that the Africans have never had it so good and are getting all or more than they deserve in the way of opportunities for advancement. Mr. Joelson opens up with a bitter indictment of 'a few dozen left wingers' in the Commons who 'by their reckless folly have encouraged almost wholly inexperienced African politicians to entertain expectations which it would be criminal folly to fulfil.'

As for democracy, Sir Roy Welensky, the Federal Premier, provides the insidious definition well worn by usage in dictatorships and oligarchies through the ages: 'The job of democracy is not to proclaim the rights of man, but to house him better, to transport him efficiently and to ensure his hygiene, his comfort and his security'.

Eagerly plying the shovel at this burial of democracy Lord Milverton comments: "We do not even know that it is the finally best form of Government for its home in the west".

A. W. Butler

## Africans Co-operate

(Wall Chart produced by Pictorial Charts Unit, 153, Uxbridge Road, London, W.7.)

This is the latest of a new series of wall charts on Africa. Its subject is the cultivation of coffee in Tanganyika and the way in which the Chagga tribe have built up the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union. The impact of the chart is essentially visual and the various stages of the Union's activities are presented in symbols and drawings. A surprising amount of factual and statistical information is, however, also conveyed and this chart should do much, both in schools and within the Co-operative movement in the United Kingdom and overseas, to bring about an appreciation of the scope of African co-operative organisation.

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